The Reconstruction

Fear of Obama

Mon, 20 Oct 2008 15:35:56 -0400

From the videos of a number of McCain-Palin supporters at rallies and elsewhere, it appears that there is a non-trivial portion of the population that is actually afraid of Barack Obama as President. Note that I'm not referring to people who simply disagree with Obama's policies, I actually mean people who fear Obama, people who believe that he would knowingly do harm to our nation. This is a dangerous phenomenon for the health of our democracy; for what set of beliefs must these people hold about their fellow Americans? About half of Americans prefer Obama over McCain, and it's reasonable to believe that even the majority of McCain supporters don't actually fear Obama. Those who do fear him, however, must believe that either half of Americans hate their country, or that the majority of Americans don't know what's going on, or some combination of the two.

Sadly, the conservative movement has propagated both of these beliefs for years. Consider whether two phrases sound familiar: "liberal elites who hate America", and "the lies of the mainstream media". These delusions, nurtured by the conservative establishment, are corrosive to the mutual respect necessary in a democracy and may lead to violent extremism and a nation irreparably divided.

"for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity"

Mon, 13 Oct 2008 09:26:11 -0400

Tyler Cowen's summary of Dr. Krugman's work is, as usual, excellent.

Congratulations, Dr. Krugman. Perhaps, given your work in international trade, international finance, and financial (specifically currency) crises, it's not surprising that you'd be recognized during one of the largest international financial crises in history... particularly given that you've been sounding warning bells since several years ago. It is, I think, a little surprising that your work on currency crises went unmentioned. I will say, however, that I am delighted to see that you've been cited for his work in economic geography, a topic that is dear to my heart. I have an enormous amount of respect for your academic work, though at times I think your popular writing hasn't cleared the same high bar you've set elsewhere in your career.

I cannot wait for the ideologues to accuse the Nobel committee of being driven by politics, and for the anti-economic folks to point out that the prize is not technically a Nobel. We might not be able to predict business cycles accurately, but some things we've got nailed.

What to Look For This Week

Mon, 6 Oct 2008 06:37:02 -0400

This week: the failure of the bailout.

Possibly. If I had to bet at even odds, I'd bet against near-total seizure of global credit markets, but it'd be a closer call than I think I want to admit to myself.

If it does fail, however, it's likely to do so sooner rather than later, and it will do so because the bailout wasn't extensive enough-- it didn't give enough probably-unconstitutional authority to Henry Paulson (or, as was never seriously discussed, someone else, a point to which I will return later). My great concern is that the crisis hits Europe with full force, bringing down a major European bank or two-- not banks on the scale of Fortis, but larger ones that couldn't be easily bailed out by their home countries' banks. This scenario that keeps me up at night starts with the TED (Treasury-Eurodollar) spread, which is the interest rate spread between the inter-bank borrowing rate (as represented by the three-month LIBOR, or London Inter-Bank Offer Rate), and the cost of "riskless" lending (as represented by three-month T-bill interest rates). The TED spread is an indicator of risk in credit markets: as the risk of borrowers defaulting on their debt rises, lenders require a higher rate of return to justify taking the risk of lending to those borrowers. At the moment, it is quite high. This increases the risk that firms that rely on short-term borrowing to cover debts won't be able to meet their obligations, and will go bankrupt as a result, creating chain reactions that ripple through the economy as their creditors are unable to meet their obligations. Obviously, this has already occurred with the highly-leveraged investment banking firms in the US, but it could spread to other sectors of the U.S. economy, which is what the bailout plan is supposed to avert. Unfortunately, to the extent that the crisis spreads to related sectors of foreign economies, the bailout plan won't do a thing to help. Given the difficulty of passing the plan through the House the first time, what are the chances that the Treasury secretary is going to be able to get the second $350 billion if he spends the first half rescuing foreign banks? I consider this a real threat; the fact that every student learns the lesson of Smoot-Hawley, that passing protectionist tariffs in the face of a massive downturn in the economy will only make things worse, does not mean that politicians will not make slightly-different-but-equally-crippling populist mistakes.

It's for this reason that I'd like to give Mr. Paulson the benefit of the doubt. It's entirely likely that some of the very smart people over at the Treasury considered the possibility of foreign bank failure and a populist backlash against using U.S. taxpayer funds for a bailout and added the language to the "Paulson Plan" that stated:

"Sec. 8. Review.

"Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency."

Of course, such language would also provide certainty to the markets-- a government bailout in limbo, awaiting a decision on a motion for summary judgment on an appeal, etc., etc., would be worse than none at all. What the Treasury clearly didn't anticipate, however, was that there would be such a powerful backlash to their brazen grab for power. Were the administration more credible, the Treasury's proposal might have had a chance. As things are, any talk of a crisis from the administration sounds an awful lot like "The Boy Who Cried Wolf", and it would clearly have been a wiser move to give much of the authority sought by Mr. Paulson to an explicitly bipartisan oversight board constituted in such a way as to be insulated from political pressures.

So-- back to my nightmare-- we're in a situation where major global banks could fail, and the U.S. would be unable to do anything. It's natural to ask, why wouldn't other countries be able to step in to save their own banks? The answer is twofold: first, when dealing with very large global banks, like RBS or Deutsche Bank, they're so large relative to their home countries' economies that the fiscal constraint would be crippling, as there's simply a lack of necessary capitalization; second, it's not clear that the European Central Bank or its member nations have the authority or competence necessary to take coordinated action on the necessary scale. Thus, we face the possibility this week that major European banks will fail, seizing up credit markets and causing a global economic contraction, as the only bailout plan that can pass is one that is too weak to actually help.

And that is why the quality of governance in relatively stable times matters more than the hot-button social issues used to manipulate the populace-- it sets the constraints of governance in times of crisis.

...and then there were none.

Mon, 22 Sep 2008 01:17:29 -0400

This evening, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley both received approval from the Fed to convert from investment banks to bank holding companies. With this, the great majority of the US investment banking sector has effectively re-regulated itself. To quote Tyler Cowen, "Whew! I'm sure glad they repealed the Glass-Steagall Act." The repeal of Glass-Steagall has had the interesting effect of allowing firms to choose between two very different institutions: the laissez-faire system of market discipline imposed through availability of funds on the money market, and the government-backed system of more highly-regulated depository institutions. For the moment at least, it seems that firms are willing to sacrifice flexibility and submit to greater oversight in exchange for public sector guarantees and access to more stable financing.

I don't think that this is a temporary shift. It's my opinion that markets tend to systematically underestimate risk for a number of reasons, not least of which is a lack of data. By way of example, it turns out that while it's relatively easy to estimate the probability of a 100-year flood, it's much more difficult to estimate the term risk of massive defaults on a package of securitized 30-year loans, because the data we have available simply doesn't allow for a sample of similar width, nor do we have data for a similar length of time. Given this, and given how closely intertwined the world's financial institutions are, a phenomenon augmented by the proliferation of instruments to distribute risk-- the fact is, none of the major investment banks could actually state its net position at any given point in time-- it's silly to expect that sufficient information exists in the market to accurately price in those events on the tails of the probability distribution. Moreover, the lack of transparency in the shadow banking sector, due in part to the complexity of the instruments being used, but also in large part due to the fact that the instruments are traded primarily in bilateral agreements rather than in an open market, further complicates efforts to understand any one firm's exposure to a given form of risk, let alone the ripple effects that could occur as a result.

If I'm right about the above, then it's worth considering also that the same interdependence that frustrates any attempt at isolating a single firm's risk profile also means that when one firm is in need of capital to remain solvent, it's likely not the only one. The availability of funds through repo loans and other standard instruments is thus prone to feedback loops that can amplify any disturbances larger than some (unknown) magnitude. As a result, I'd argue that the entire model of investment banking that finally vanished this evening was inherently unstable, and that while we will see a return of many of its elements, they will not take on the same form as they did before. Most notably, we should look for more transparency in formerly opaque instruments, possibly including a central clearinghouse for many types of transactions, and a much more conservative approach to debt financing. While I can't pretend to know what the future regulatory environment will look like, I do think that such changes would be a positive step in reducing the risks posed to the greater economy as a result of disturbances in the financial sector.

Dear Wall Street Journal, Please Learn the Definition of 'Moral Hazard'

Mon, 15 Sep 2008 05:30:00 -0400

From the WSJ:

A Chaotic Sunday Opens Wall Street's Week
Moral Hazard's Exit
Leaves Investors
To Sort Out the Mess
By ANNELENA LOBB
September 15, 2008; Page C1

Investors are going to be staring in the face of moral hazard when markets open Monday.

The collapse of Wall Street firm Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. coupled with a restructuring of insurer American International Group Inc. and a deal by Merrill Lynch & Co. to sell itself to Bank of America could cause a decline, particularly among financial stocks, when markets open.

Despite serious efforts by potential bidders and Lehman, a deal never came together over the weekend, largely because the federal government refused to put up any cash. After backstopping Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury and Federal Reserve said no more.

The government's logic was that if investors were bailed out again, they would expect a bailout every time, and the so-called moral hazard would disappear, making people willing to take massive risks in the belief they would be saved.

No. That is not what 'moral hazard' means. Moral hazard is, as Wikipedia so eloquently puts it, "the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk." Thus, in this case, it wasn't a risk that moral hazard would disappear; it was instead a risk that a bailout would create moral hazard, by insulating investors from the consequences of risks they had taken on, and thus encouraging similar risky behavior in the future.

Gasoline Inventories and Price Volatility

Thu, 29 May 2008 16:56:46 -0400

In response to Tim Haab's question as to whether gas prices are becoming more volatile... I argue that it's at work.

News Flash: Demand Curves Slope Downwards

Tue, 27 May 2008 21:59:17 -0400

CNN, on this breathtaking development:

As gas goes up, driving goes down
(CNN) -- At a time when gas prices are at an all-time high, Americans have curtailed their driving at a historic rate.
The Department of Transportation said figures from March show the steepest decrease in driving ever recorded.

Tomorrow, a special report: "Fire is hot."

Dark Suckers

Mon, 10 Mar 2008 20:00:39 -0400

If anyone remembers the old internet joke theory known as the "Dark Sucker Theory", the one in which light bulbs do not emit light but instead suck dark, they might be surprised to learn that this piece of silly internet humor is pretty well-aged. In a New York Times article on Daylight Savings Time, a reference to a letter written by Ben Franklin notes an 18th-century jokester's "insistence that opening the shutters to greet the dawn lets out the darkness rather than bringing in the light." The article itself reports more evidence that the provision in the generally-awful Energy Policy Act of 2005 that changed the dates for Daylight Savings Time has probably increased overall electricity usage. No surprises there.

What Is and Is Not Genocide

Wed, 18 Apr 2007 07:00:00 -0400

The word "genocide" carries with it powerful emotional and political implications. As such, there are always those who will attempt to deny or belittle an actual genocide, or claim as a genocide something that is not.

In the former category, there are those like Ann Coulter, herself a joke, who here makes a poor attempt at one:

Saddam's barbaric rape rooms, chemical attacks and torture � those, liberals could live with. But now they want us to send troops to Darfur, a country from which no one anticipates terrorism anytime in the next millennium. If you're looking for a good definition of "no imminent threat," Darfur is it. The climate change "emergency," set to start taking effect sometime during the next century, is a more imminent threat to the United States than Darfur.

These people can't even wrap up genocide. We've been hearing about this slaughter in Darfur forever � and they still haven't finished. The aggressors are moving like termites across that country. It's like genocide by committee. Who's running this holocaust in Darfur, FEMA?

We would, if it weren't so ignorant, ignore the fact that Darfur is not a country-- it's a part of Sudan, which, under the rule of the National Islamic Front (which is still in power) harbored Osama bin Laden for five years. Having noted the sheer ignorance of this statement, however, we should point out that though it may not be proceeding as quickly as Coulter would like, the conflict in Darfur has claimed up to 450,000 lives. Is it a genocide?

According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

By the definition of the term-- absolutely, yes, what is happening in Darfur is genocide.

In the latter category, that of those who wish to make genocide out of other situations that, while tragic, do not qualify, we have examples like the following, from a Washington Post article about violence in Rio:

"For young people, this is a genocide," said Raquel Willadino, a director of violence-related issues and human rights for the Observatory of Favelas. "And I don't mean that as a metaphor. It really is a genocide."

The violence in Rio is certainly devastating-- extrapolating the numbers in the article, 9 people are dying every day from violence-- over 3,200 a year. It is not, however, the number dead that makes a genocide what it is. It is that the acts are "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such". This doesn't appear to be the case in Rio, and so claiming it as genocide doesn't do anything more than cheapen the word.

Bush on the Lessons of the Vietnam War

Fri, 17 Nov 2006 07:00:00 -0500

From CNN.com:

HANOI, Vietnam (AP) -- U.S. President George W. Bush said Friday the United States' unsuccessful war in Vietnam three decades ago offered lessons for the American-led struggle in Iraq.

"We'll succeed unless we quit," Bush said shortly after arriving in this one-time war capital.

It's a little worrisome that the lesson from Vietnam that our President thinks applies best to Iraq is that "We'll succeed unless we quit." Honestly, though, it's far more worrisome that he extracted that lesson from the Vietnam war at all. I wasn't alive at the time, so I'm not qualified to judge, but I always thought that even to someone who only made a cameo appearance on a National Guard base in Alabama, the war couldn't have looked like something that we were guaranteed to win (unless we quit).

To me, a more interesting set of lessons from Vietnam to compare to our policies and experience in Iraq would be those offered by Robert McNamara, Nixon's Secretary of Defense:

We misjudged then � and we have since � the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries � and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience � We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
We failed then � and have since � to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine�
We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement � before we initiated the action.
After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course � we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.
We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.
We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action � should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions � At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

I leave it as an exercise for the reader to decide which of these lessons apply to Iraq.

I grabbed the list from the Wikipedia entry on Errol Morris's superlative documentary, "The Fog of War"; it's the list that inspired the movie, but it is not the one that forms the structure of the film, nor is it the one provided as an addendum by McNamara himself.